24 April 2015, Budapest

Good Morning, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to extend my warmest welcome to our guests from abroad. Welcome to those present here today who took part in the drafting of the current Hungarian constitution, and welcome to attendees prominent in the field of the rule of law in Hungary, and also the heads of state institutions. I would particularly like to extend warm greetings to you, former Prime Minister.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have just come back from a conference on the question of asylum, a prime ministers’ summit in Brussels, with the good news that those who prize constitutional identity will have plenty of work in June, when the European Union will debate and plan to create its immigration strategy; for Member States this may materially touch on the issue of constitutional identity.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is not what I would like to talk about now, however. Four years after the adoption of Hungary’s Fundamental Law, we are now seeking to examine the supporting framework and building blocks which helped us to create this edifice. Before I come to the point of my speech, I would like you to recall for a moment the disputes which took place between the European Union and Hungary over our Constitution. A Member State of the European Union drafted a new constitution. This was an unexpected development, which caught the European Union unprepared. It caught the European Union unprepared, because before their accession to the EU the other former communist countries had already created new constitutions in order to close the preceding historical period and open a new one. Hungary had been unable to manage this, and therefore we were compelled to create a new constitution later, as a Member State of the European Union. In my experience what followed was that the benchmark in subsequent disputes became Hungary’s Fundamental Law itself. The examiner became the subject of examination: not only did the current system of EU law sit in judgement, but this system itself was put on trial, judged according to the Fundamental Law of Hungary. All this has taken place before our eyes, and we have thus been able to gauge the performance of European institutions. Double standards, exertion of pressure and ideologically-based exaggerations. With regard to the process of drafting and adopting Hungary’s constitution, all this is a chapter which remains to be written. In my view, this is a natural phenomenon in a democratic environment, in which the Member States of the European Union are also themselves sovereign states. But there was just one group of people who failed to understand this: they hauled Hungary’s Fundamental Law off for trial in Brussels, in a mirror image of their ideological predecessors’ peddling of the communist constitution in Moscow. But as we have pointed out more than once: Brussels is not Moscow.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The road that led to the Fundamental Law is an enlightening one. At the time of the fall of communism, comprehensive constitutional changes regulating the transition were adopted in much the same manner as when a signalman operates the points on a railway line. We found that the carriage continued running past the end of state socialism’s dead-end track. Meanwhile, the countries around us were not only disposing of their crumbling railway sleepers, but were replacing the tracks, the station and the signalman. Among the post-communist European countries, only Hungary did not create a new constitution. As the Honourable Justice Minister has written several times: for two decades new wine was poured into the old wine-skin. It is no wonder that the document that emerged from under the cosmetic surgeon’s knife in 1989 was seen by everyone at the time as a transitional constitution: even its own preamble laid down that it would only remain in force until the adoption of a new constitution for Hungary. In spite of this, a temporary solution solidified into permanence. For us this is not an unfamiliar experience; it reminds us of Soviet troops, who were supposedly stationed in Hungary on a temporary basis. All this, however, was hardly a credit to Hungarian politics. For twenty years, successive Hungarian parliaments proved incapable of fulfilling their constitutional obligation: they were unable to create a new constitution to replace a set of transitional rules which had committed itself to its own replacement. We were left with an old, amended constitution, “souped up” for a market economy: a Mercedes engine installed in a Trabant, juddering along in a series of lurches. Interestingly, over the course of time its basic flaws (such as its value-neutrality, and its transitional and technical nature) were slowly elevated to the status of virtues – at least by those who went on to become its champions.

On one occasion, in the 1994 general election, the Hungarian people gave the left-wing parties the opportunity to create a new constitution; Hungary was left without one, however. I am not speaking now according to my own political convictions – because if I were, I would say “Thank God for that!” I am merely looking at this question in terms of constitutional responsibility and noting the fact that while a left-wing government in Hungary had a two-thirds parliamentary majority, it nonetheless failed to meet its constitutional obligation to give the country a new constitution. It is another interesting Hungarian phenomenon that this fact – their failure to meet their constitutional obligation – was later presented by them as a virtue and a badge of honour. This is interesting enough in itself, but it is also important supporting information – particularly for foreigners – to help us understand a Hungarian attitude on political leadership: more precisely, on how to create a virtue out of failure and a lack of leadership.

In 2010 the civic government (Fidesz-KDNP) did not shy away from its responsibility. As we say in the language of politics, the government majority at that time understood the will of the electorate. Even during the election campaign, we did not conceal our intentions, and made it perfectly clear before the second round of the election that if we were granted a two-thirds mandate we would create a new constitution for Hungary. In our evaluation Hungarian voters understood that finally we had to end the protracted and chaotic period of transition, and open a new page in the country’s history. The other option open to us was to subject the over-amended constitution to further amendment; we did not want to take this path, however. Since 1990 Hungary’s parliament had already carried out more than enough patching of what was itself a patch-up of Act XX of 1949, and we had learnt that no amount of patching could be enough to cover the redness of the original text.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

After this brief introduction, let us look at what the concept of “constitution” means in the general context of Hungarian political studies.

Honourable Foreign Guests,

When we Hungarians talk about things like this, we usually do so by going back to the body of work produced by Ferenc Deák, the Justice Minister in the first accountable Hungarian government. Likewise, I shall evoke his memory here. Deák made three points. First of all, in Deák’s view, our constitution is a historical constitution. Allow me to quote him: “It was not produced at a stroke, but it developed from the life of the nation”. He goes on to assert that “it therefore continues to emerge according to the development of the life of the nation”. His third point, referring to the development of the life of the nation, is that “as it has solidified over the course of centuries, we took over from our ancestors the work of centuries, and it is our duty to pass it down to our successors as long as we can.” The “we” he refers to are the Hungarian people of his day. I apologise to our interpreters, but these are the three pillars on which today’s Hungarian constitutional system is based.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This allows us to conclude that, according to Ferenc Deák and the traditional Hungarian approach, a constitution means much more than a neutral catalogue of legal provisions which is devoid of values. In the traditional sense it means the historical constitution, which contained all the written or unwritten rules which have guided Hungarian society since the foundation of the Hungarian State. Our forebears used the concept to mean a national consensus establishing a direct link between law and morals; its foundations were provided by documents such as King Stephen’s Admonitions, the Golden Bull of 1222, the Tripartitum or the Pragmatica Sanctio. We also adopted this approach. We are convinced that, for as long as the Hungarian State exists, there is and will always be a historical constitution. This is why we decided to call the document we are focusing on today “The Fundamental Law”; it is a document which may be integrated into the fabric and attainments of the historical constitution. Deák, too, looked upon this tradition as something which developed organically together with the life of the nation, and which the nation always adjusted to the most important questions of each era. As the constitution became intertwined with the history of the nation, the need also emerged for the history of the nation to become integrated into the text of the Fundamental Law. Based on this, we can say three important things: three important conclusions guided us in our work as fundamental principles originating from Deák.

First of all, similar to the Holy Crown, the constitution – in its essence as well as in its text – symbolises the continuity of the history of the Hungarian nation, of its political and cultural life. Consequently, we could not possibly attempt to create a text which, through the simple omission of the words “Hungarian” and “Hungary” could be the constitution of any other democratic European country.

Secondly, as the constitution evolves from the life of the nation, it must follow the changes that have occurred in the fate of the country. We could not therefore attempt to draft a text which gave the slightest suggestion that the Hungarians had only just entered through Europe’s doors the previous day, and that nothing of note had ever happened to us before that time.

Thirdly, given that the tradition bequeathed to us by Deák refers to the constitution as a document which serves to create an identity and which is passed down as a living tradition from one generation to the next, we looked upon the constitution as “the nation’s identity card”. In consequence, we could not possibly attempt to create a text which disregards all that we have: our land, our language, and the natural and intellectual assets which we have both inherited from our ancestors and borrowed from our descendants. Measuring the former constitution (which was the communist constitution re-worded after the fall of communism) against these three triangulation points shows us that the creation of Hungary’s Fundamental Law was an historic task and a necessity. For this very reason, and in contrast to the previous document’s neutral text, the Fundamental Law fulfils one of its most important functions when, as an interpretative background, it declares the achievements of the historical constitution. An example of this is the Doctrine of the Holy Crown, which may be regarded as a contemporary manifestation of the separation of powers, the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Guests,

One of the basic flaws of our transitional constitution before the enactment of the Fundamental Law was that it failed to declare historical continuity and failed to give an adequate response to the changes which have taken place throughout the nation’s history. We cannot ignore, with a mere shrug of the shoulders, the fact that Hungary’s history in the 20th century included a series of events which disrupted the country’s historical continuity: humiliating peace treaties following defeat in war, military occupations, dictatorships and radically opposing political systems. Going beyond the demands of sheer logic and history, we cannot ignore this, because the events of the 20th century and decades of silence regarding these events led to the past being subjected to contradictory interpretations in our present-day lives, and before 2010 this prevented the emergence of the consensus needed for the adoption of a new constitution. In other words, the development of the history of the nation in the 20th century demanded that those working in the realm of politics create a constitution which answers questions such as who we are and how we perceive our own place and role in Europe in the light of the past 1,100 years – and, in particular, the last 100 years.

Therefore the constitution declares – because it had to declare – that for a thousand years Christianity has been a force preserving Hungary’s nationhood. The constitution declares – because it had to declare – that with the German occupation of Hungary on 19 March 1944 we lost our sovereignty, which we were only able to restore on 2 May 1990. The constitution declares – because it had to declare – that we condemn the crimes committed in Hungary under National Socialism and international socialism (i.e. communism), and that we reject any statute of limitations for those crimes. The latter is something that we owe to our brothers and sisters who were killed or persecuted during the Nazi and communist regimes. And the constitution declares – because it had to declare – that, bearing in mind that there is one single, cohesive Hungarian nation, Hungary bears responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders and supports their prosperity in their native lands. And, bearing in mind our history and the economic crisis of 2008, which plunged people into debt and poverty, the constitution also declares – because it had to declare – that we must create rules according to which Parliament shall not ratify a central budget which leads to an increase in the country’s sovereign debt. Therefore, the Fiscal Council has controlling powers over the central budget of the day and, learning from previous desperate firefighting efforts, our constitution has introduced an effective fire protection system.

Furthermore, Dear Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, four years ago we passed one of Europe’s most modern constitutions. It is one of Europe’s most modern constitutions for three reasons. This constitution – our modern constitution – provides constitutional protection for the jobs of women, the elderly, people with disabilities, young people and parents. It confirms that the life of the unborn child is entitled to protection in the mother’s womb, and it also declares that the right to physical and mental health entails the preservation of agriculture free from genetically modified organisms.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The most important change, however, is that, compared with the old “value-neutral” text (and in common with the constitutions of other countries), Hungary’s Fundamental Law also presents our constitutional identity. As defined in the constitution, this cultural identity in some respects connects us to other nations, and in other respects sets us apart; it thereby establishes our place in Europe and in the world. Hungary’s Fundamental Law is akin to those constitutions which create an opportunity for a citizen of the country to enter the text as if it were a building: the main body of the Fundamental Law is like a church nave, off which the cardinal Acts open like side aisles. The National Avowal itself is not a mere ornament or appendage at the beginning of the text, but is an integral part of it: it is the gateway through which we enter the building that is the constitution.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am convinced that the historical sweep of the National Avowal and the commitment to freedom that is expressed therein convey values on which every Hungarian can agree, regardless of party affiliation. That they can agree does not mean that they will agree; but the text offers this chance, and the quality and the depth of the text make this possible. What, for example, is meant by the sentence “We, the members of the Hungarian nation”? There was much debate over the wording, but we eventually decided on this formulation. This sentence seeks to express the idea that the nation is not merely the sum of those now alive, or those who are eligible to vote, but individuals in a procession of generations, changing yet unified. Unified in a community which not only includes the living, but also those who have died and those who are yet to be born. Perceived in this way, the interest of a community is always more than the sum total of the interests of the people who constitute that community at any given moment. This has far-reaching consequences and imposes far-reaching responsibilities. I know that this constitutional approach is disputed by many around the world; but it has an equally large number of followers. We adopted this constitutional approach, which we could say is in the style of Lipmann, as his views reveal to us most clearly what is actually meant in the constitution by the words: “We, the members of the Hungarian nation”. In any event, the Fundamental Law adopted the following state philosophy: the National Avowal speaks on behalf of a cultural community and a body of tradition which is passed down from generation to generation and which sees a Hungarian people torn apart and driven to different parts of the world and defines it as a united nation. In the language of politics we call this the Hungarian world nation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Finally, a word about the issue of identity. The motto of the European Union is “United in diversity”. This means that we are Europe, Europe is Hungary, Europe is Germany, Europe is France, and Europe is Italy as well; and we could continue this list to include all 28 Member States. In other words, there is no subordinate or inferior category of values among those present within the individual and distinct national systems which are regarded as European or which have become European. The whole of Europe accepts, for example, the eternal principles which constitute the inalterable provisions of the German constitution. The whole of Europe accepts the German constitutional identity which confirms the state’s social responsibility. The whole of Europe accepts French laïcité as part of the French constitutional identity. The whole of Europe accepts that, through defining the Holy Trinity in its preamble, the Greek constitution invokes theological concepts, and Europe also accepts privileges of birth linked to state powers, as in kingdoms. And the whole of Europe accepts that members of a senate may be appointed for life in certain countries. This is all Europe, and it is not inferior or heretical.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The only question that now remains is this: which are the definable elements of the Hungarian constitutional identity? It would be a fine task to answer this question; but if a single individual were able to give an answer, why would so many of us have gathered here together? While I shall mention a few elements, I believe that this debate is not only far from closed, but that it may have yet to begin in earnest. Now might be the time for legal experts, philosophers of law and social scientists to analyse the Hungarian constitution also from the viewpoint of the elements of Hungarian identity and constitutional identity which are reflected in it. As one of those who took part in drafting and approving the text, I would now like to focus on four of these elements, and thereby participate in a debate, so to speak, which has yet to begin.

The first element is the question of the protection of language and culture. In the Hungarian constitution this is represented with a force found in the constitutions of few other – or perhaps no other – European countries; therefore the specific rules that relate to this issue may be regarded as a constituent part of Hungary’s constitutional identity. Secondly, the constitution declares that “individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation with others”; in other words, the Hungarian constitution is based on the communal principle. One of the chapters is entitled “Freedom and Responsibility”. This is a community-centred constitution, which finds individual freedom meaningful only in cooperation with others. In my view, this is an element of constitutional identity. Thirdly, this constitution defines the concept of the work-based society; to be precise, it may declare that concept rather than define it. It says – and perhaps this is not a verbatim quotation – that we hold that the strength of a community and the honour of every person are based on work and the achievement of the human mind. And finally, the fourth element of the identity of our constitution is the historical dimension: it is open towards the historical constitution and also integrates legal documents unique to Hungarian history. There are many debates concerning the issue of constitutional identity, and there are different schools and approaches. I think that the French school of thought is a remarkable one. It addresses the very difficult question of what constitutes constitutional identity and defines it in very simple terms, with a clarity and directness which may perhaps hold some attraction. It states that “everything which is significant and distinguishes one country from another may be regarded as an element of constitutional identity”.

We may state with pride, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we have something to defend, and we will have something to defend in future European debates. Thank you for your attention, and in summary, I believe that Hungary’s Fundamental Law is a coherent system of values and was conceived on the basis of a well-considered concept. In its construction we also used elements which former builders rejected, such as the achievements of our historical constitution, while we integrated provisions derived from earlier rulings by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Based on all this, we clearly expressed the set of values which Hungary claims as its own, as a democratic European country, and which defines for us the world of freedom and responsibility. I would like to close my brief address with the final line of our constitution: “May there be peace, freedom and accord”.

Thank you for your attention.

(Prime Minister's Office)